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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After Vladimir Putin’s Russia returned to Latin
America and the Caribbean, strategic communication became a key engagement tool, enabling
Moscow to apply sharp power in the region successfully. As a result, during the last decade,
Moscow created mechanisms that effectively
communicate values, interests, and narratives
to facilitate Russia’s foreign policy objectives in
the Western Hemisphere. This research traces
the advance of Russian information strategy in
the Latin American information space during
the last decades and shows:
•

A high degree of institutionalization of
Russian strategic communication, particularly of the RT TV channel and Sputnik
News Network as primary tools of Russia’s
communication abroad.

•

RT acquired a noticeable share of international media space in Latin America in
terms of budget, workforce, digital platforms, and audience reach.

•

Specific characteristics of Russia’s return
to Latin America and the Caribbean, including the notion of symbolic reciprocity,
which shapes the political context in which
strategic communication occurs.

•

The main narratives employed by RT and
other Russian government-controlled media outlets in the region. The story lines of
the Venezuelan crisis and COVID-19 pandemic illustrate the approaches adapted
by Russia to disseminate information to
Latin American audiences.

The report confirms that RT in Spanish and
Sputnik Mundo are the primary vehicles of
Russian information strategy among the Spanish-speaking population in the Western Hemisphere. Today, they are a familiar source of information for millions of Latin Americans exposed
to an alternative view to the one promoted by
the United States and other democratic governments. In addition, Russia’s strategic communication via RT and Sputnik Mundo casts doubts
about the United States and its regional allies’
policies regarding critical regional and international topics. Furthermore, the media controlled
by the Russian government attacks the values
of liberal democracy and portrays authoritarian

regimes as more suitable for solving contemporary societal problems. Finally, although RT in
Spanish and Sputnik Mundo may still have fewer viewers than the mainstream media in Latin
America, they are gaining new followers. They
can extend their reach in the future. To mitigate
Russia’s efforts, it is necessary to:
•

Raise the awareness of decision-makers and the Latin American public regarding the nature of Russia’s government-controlled mass media.

•

Escalate U.S. and other democratic government-led strategic communication
efforts in the region via media outlets
broadcasting in Spanish.

•

Conduct specialized surveys that would
help to better identify the impact of
Russian media on Latin American public
opinion.

INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, Latin America and the Caribbean served as a stage for power competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The logic of a bipolar world guided the
policy design of Washington and Moscow. After
the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, new Russia lost its interest in the region. Facing enormous economic difficulties, the government
of Boris Yeltsin collaborated with the United
States on many international agenda topics. Yet
at the beginning of 2000, under the government
of Vladimir Putin, Russia returned to the Western Hemisphere, and it is possible to point out
some features of its continuous presence in the
region since then. The use of strategic communication as a tool of engagement is one.
In today’s constantly changing international environment, in addition to the use of hard
power, many countries explore new approaches
to reach their foreign policy objectives. These
are often referred to as “hybrid warfare,” which
includes “information warfare.”1 While the phenomenon lacks a commonly accepted definition, it is associated with scenarios in which
actors use nonmilitary means to achieve political goals by the states, including economy
and trade, international development cooperation, information, and humanitarian assistance.
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At the same time, not all states possess equal
capacities to conduct a full range of activities
in all areas of engagement. Therefore, they often choose to concentrate on what is affordable and most effective. Moreover, in various
scenarios, the states complement traditional approaches with a “hybrid warfare” toolkit.
Non-traditional instruments offer greater flexibility and deniability, allowing governments to
revise their strategies and quickly adjust existing narratives to new demands. Recent studies reveal that non-traditional approaches in
Russia became necessary for reaching specific
foreign policy aims that otherwise would be difficult to achieve.2
This report uses the strategic communication
framework to examine Russia’s information policy in the Western Hemisphere. Global strategic
communication is part of diverse and heterogeneous activities by many actors, including
states, transnational corporations, international
organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This study focuses on strategic communications by states as “a mode of thought and
practices promising to enhance state capabilities encompassing long-established activities,
including public diplomacy, public relations,
nation branding, and information operations.”3
From this perspective, it is important to differentiate strategic communication and soft power. After Joseph Nye coined the soft power concept in the late 1980s, it became widely used to
characterize many international developments.
Soft power refers to the capacity of nations to
take advantage of the attractiveness of their
political models and cultural or technological
achievements to influence people living in other countries. The use of soft power can bring
the desired results to states through attraction
rather than coercion or financial commitment.4
However, in Russia’s case, there are many limits
to exercising soft power. In the first years after
the end of the Soviet Union, Russia attempted—rather unsuccessfully—to erase the Soviet legacy and portray itself as a promoter of
democratic values and human rights. Between
2000 and 2020, Putin transformed the political
institutions and built a “sovereign state with
Russian values.” From this perspective, the official emphasis on the uniqueness of Russian
civilization, combined with assertive foreign
policy, diminished the attractiveness of Russia
radically in terms of soft power compared to
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other prominent international actors. Therefore,
Moscow opted to create mechanisms that could
effectively communicate specific values, interests, and goals abroad to facilitate foreign policy objectives despite Russia’s soft power limits.
These mechanisms can be studied through the
lens of another concept, namely, “sharp power.”
Introduced by Christopher Walker and Jessica
Ludwig, sharp power describes “authoritarian
influence efforts that seek to pierce, penetrate,
and perforate the political and information environments of targeted countries.”5 From the
analytical perspective, the sharp power notion allows for a more accurate assessment of
the forces shaping Russian information flows
abroad. As this report will demonstrate, Russia’s
strategic communication is Moscow’s principal
vehicle of sharp power that enables the Putin
government to “cut into the fabric of a society,
stoking and amplifying existing divisions.”6
This report is organized as follows. First, there is
a discussion of the institutionalization of Russian strategic communication, paying particular
attention to the RT TV channel as the essential
instrument of the Russian government’s communication strategy. Next, the specific characteristics of Russia’s return to Latin America and
the Caribbean are explained, focusing on the
particular context in which strategic communication became a vital engagement tool. Third,
the main narratives employed by RT and other
media outlets in the region are identified. Finally, recommendations on mitigating Moscow’s
efforts are provided.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: THE
CASE OF RT AND SPUTNIK
At the initial stage of the institutionalization of
Moscow’s strategic communication7 in the early 2000s, the desire to use soft power was the
Kremlin’s point of departure.8 Therefore, the
organization of a state-sponsored TV channel
to broadcast abroad became a priority. In the
beginning, Moscow did not have a clear strategy. Initially, the channel would promote Russia’s
cultural advancements and showcase today’s
Russia. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the attractiveness of Russia’s political model and cultural or technological achievements to people
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living in other countries as the only narrative
would not alone suffice as the broad agenda of
international communication. During this period,
Russia was perceived as a weak and troubled
state, not one that would be attractive abroad
in conventional terms of soft power.9 Therefore,
the Putin government needed a tool of strategic
communication that would be both capable of
delivering Russia’s message worldwide and sufficiently flexible to make adjustments following
changes in foreign policy objectives. The organizational design of RT fully responded to this
goal (see Table 1).

TABLE 1. RT MEDIA MODEL
Purpose

To serve as a tool of Russia’s strategic communication

Main narrative

Changing from projecting Russia’s soft power (2005-2008) to
criticism of the United States and
Western democracies (post-2008)

Ideology

Anti-West

Control

Hiring loyalists for key positions,
assigning stories, and offering
monetary incentives to staff

Ownership

State

Hiring Journalists

Supervised by the government

Profits

Non-profit driven

Redlines

Criticism of the Russian government

Self-Censorship

High

Source: Adapted from Mona Elswah and Philip N. Howard,
“Anything that Causes Chaos:” The Organizational Behavior
of Russia Today (RT), Journal of Communication, Volume 70,
Issue 5 (October 2020): 641, doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqaa027.

On June 6, 2005, the news agency RIA Novosti announced the launch of the Russia Today
television channel to “reflect the Russian position on the main issues of international politics.”10 The 25-year-old journalist Margarita
Simonyan became editor-in-chief and CEO of
the company. Russia Today began broadcasting
in English only. As Moscow’s need for strategic
communication broadened, RIA Novosti added
the Arabic language channel Rusiya Al-Yaum in
2007. In 2009, the channel changed its name
to RT.11 Two years later, RT launched the Spanish language channel RT Actualidad, RT America
for the U.S. audience in 2010, and the RT documentary channel in 2011.

Accurate data regarding RT’s actual global
reach is not available. Some reports suggest
that RT overestimates the share of its participation in the information market globally.12 Still,
according to the latest reports, RT’s audience
could be as many as 800 million viewers worldwide.13 RT claims to use more than two dozen
satellites and over 300 operators, distributing
information feeds to more than 100 countries.14
RT’s workforce has also grown substantially. In
2005, for example, Russia Today employed 300
journalists, including approximately 70 from
outside Russia. By 2010, RT’s staff accounted for 2,000 employees.15 Two years later, the
channel moved its production to a new hightech facility in Moscow, upgraded its broadcasting to high-definition, and opened new
fully-owned subsidiaries, including news agency Ruptly,16 RT en Français (French), and RT
Deutsch (German).17
A review of the institutionalization of Russia’s
strategic communication via media outlets
would be incomplete without mentioning the
Sputnik news agency. It is part of the same
organizational framework as RT. The agency’s
head office is in Moscow, with regional offices
in Washington, Cairo, Beijing, Montevideo, and
Bishkek. In addition, Sputnik’s websites, podcasts, and traditional open-air broadcasting
services operate in more than 30 languages,
with over 16 million social media subscribers.18
When it comes to the financial support received
by RT for its operations, reliable data is again
limited. According to publicly available information, RIA Novosti invested $30 million in startup costs in 2005 and financed several subsequent years of operations at similar numbers.
Since a significant part of RT’s operation costs
consists of distributing its feed to audiences
abroad—which extended dramatically—the
budget increased from $80 million in 2007 to at
least $380 million in 2011.19 Moreover, the Putin
government decided to include RT in the list of
Russia’s strategic enterprises with guaranteed
funding. Annual support to Russia’s strategic
communication via media outlets accounted
for $540 million between 2016 and 2020.20 In
2021, the approved budget for all Russian information agencies increased to $700 million,21
recognition of the crucial role the channel plays
as a tool of strategic communication.
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Another indicator of RT and Sputnik’s activities
in the information space is their geographical
distribution. Here it is necessary to emphasize
that the geographical distribution of RT followers is unequal. At some point, RT and affiliated
media outlets had been one of the rising foreign sources of information for a specific type
of viewer in the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, and other European countries. Yet,
the RT audience in Western countries is unstable and likely to decline due to public debates
about the role of these media in the information
space. In other parts of the world, particularly in Latin America, Russian efforts at strategic
communication are more successful for several
reasons. One is the specific features of the media market in the region, including the relatively
weak presence of foreign news media broadcasting programs in Spanish made specifically
for the Latin American audience. The other reasons are the poorly satisfied demands of various strata of society for coverage of international topics and the growing use of the internet
and social media platforms as news sources.22
From the above perspective, one of the factors
that facilitated the growth of the RT audience is
the pioneering use of YouTube and social media
networks. In 2013, for instance, RT made headlines becoming the first TV channel to reach one
billion views on YouTube.23 By 2020, RT claimed
another record by reaching 10 billion views on
YouTube.24 As of 2021, RT in English had over
four million subscribers, while RT in Spanish had
more than five million subscribers, and RT in Arabic had almost six million25 (see Figure 1).

Note: As of August 2021.
Source: Created by author with data from YouTube, July 2021.
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Despite the diversity of programs and different
approaches to distinct regions of the world, a
close examination of the content produced by
RT, Sputnik, and affiliated agencies reveals several standard features. First, RT is an “opportunistic channel.” Russian media constantly include politically unrelated news and reports like
sensationalized bulletins in its feed. This strategy aims to recruit new followers who otherwise
would not be interested in getting information
from RT or Sputnik.26 It also provides Russia with
the potential to use a CNN-like effect understood as real-time communication to provoke
the desired response from foreign audiences.
Second, the main political narratives employed
by Russian media for foreign audiences support
the official position of the Russian government.
It is not to say that RT and Sputnik focus exclusively on Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Yet, it
is a clear priority of its information coverage.27
For instance, as Sean Steiner and Sarah Oates
have shown, RT in Spanish responds almost
immediately to the government’s official statements and announcements by including corresponding narratives in its information feeds.28
Third, Russian strategic communication via
mass media is tailor-made for specific regions.
It is different from Soviet propaganda, which
used communist ideology as a universal base
to showcase the Soviet political system and
spread communist ideas worldwide. For example, RT and Sputnik programs destined for Western Europe emphasize conservative “traditional
values,” which are attractive to ultraconservative and nationalist sectors of European societies. The anchors of programs for European audiences choose to invite experts and analysts
considered reliable by a conservative audience.
As a result, there are limits to the further growth
of RT’s influence in this region.
In other parts of the world, RT’s “information
menu” varies. It is designed to take advantage
of opportunities unique to each region. In Latin
America, many of RT’s politically sensitive programs align with narratives promoted by political forces to the left of the political spectrum.
The other programs, however, may appeal to
a broader audience. For instance, some of the
Documentales de RT channel reports have millions of views and target heterogeneous audiences. These include sports and programs ded-
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icated to high-tech products often anchored by
celebrities associated with political forces other
than the Latin American left.29 In these reports,
RT presenters align their views with centrist and
even right-wing political ideologies.30 With Latin
American societies becoming ideologically more
polarized,31 RT’s potential looks promising for
Moscow. By using its media outlets, Russia can
reach out to various segments of the population
and skillfully apply sharp power by questioning
established facts related to sensitive topics for
different viewers.32 This is the true meaning of
RT’s slogan “sepa más” (“know more”).

ment officials are frequent visitors. In addition,
the Kremlin became a key protagonist of important developments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and
Cuba.34 There are several reasons behind Russia’s decision to return to the Western Hemisphere. The notion of reciprocity is the foremost
factor. Although it is easy to trace the genesis
of this idea back to the Soviet Union, today, it
is primarily symbolic reciprocity. The fact is, a
majority of the elites that govern Russia today
continue to view the entire Western Hemisphere
as Washington’s priority area of political,

economic, and social concern.

Finally, Russian media dedicate a substantial
part of its programs to dispute the U.S. political
system and Washington’s global and regional
policies. As tensions in U.S.-Russian relations
increased, Putin’s government came to appreciate the opportunities of using RT and Sputnik
as a strategic communication tool even more.
Russia’s strategic communication via RT and
Sputnik vis-à-vis the United States is twofold.
First, it casts doubt on the viewpoint of the
United States and its allies on critical international topics while offering alternative explanations of key global events to a foreign audience.
In addition, the media controlled by the Russian
government attacks the values of liberal democracy and portrays authoritarian regimes as
more suitable for solving the problems of contemporary societies. In many cases, RT’s information flow is no less than deliberate disinformation intended to mislead its viewers.33 While
this facet of Russia’s strategic communication
can be identified in all world regions, it is in Latin America where the anti-U.S. narrative dominates. As discussed in more detail below, the
logic of symbolic reciprocity is the main driving
force of Russian engagement.

Similarly, the top officials of Russia’s government consider the territory of the former Soviet
Union, a “near abroad,” as the most important
geographical area for Moscow outside Russia’s
borders.35 Russian leadership is convinced that
Moscow has the right to have special interests
in this “near abroad” because of historical, cultural, and economic ties. Hence, post-Soviet
Russian leaders insist that all governments outside the region must consider Russia’s special
interests before advancing their relations with
the countries of the former Soviet Union.

RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH
LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN
Today, Russia is back in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and its visibility in the region has
never been as strong. Moscow maintains diplomatic relations with all Latin American and Caribbean nations, Russian passport holders can
travel freely in the region, and Russian govern-

Furthermore, most Russian elites believe the
United States constantly ignores the Kremlin’s
interests in the former Soviet territories and,
consequently, Russia must maintain its presence in Latin America, a U.S. “near abroad,” as
a reciprocal action. Also, there is a consensus
in Moscow that the presence of Russia in the
Western Hemisphere constitutes a factor that
could help the Kremlin negotiate with Washington regarding the U.S. presence in the neighboring territories of Russia and other regions of
Moscow’s concern. Therefore, in its 2013 foreign doctrine, the Kremlin assigned “strategic”
importance to its relations with Latin America.
In other words, for Putin’s Russia, one of the
critical values of Latin America and the Caribbean is its geographical proximity to the United
States.
Symbolic reciprocity has multiple manifestations
in the realm of Russian foreign policy. First, it is
an opportunity for Putin’s government to show
that Russia can respond reciprocally to what is
perceived by the Russian elites as destructive
actions by the U.S. government in Moscow’s
“near abroad.” For example, during the crises in
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government expressed its concerns re-
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garding the U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea
and the support offered by Washington to anti-Russian forces in Georgia and Ukraine.36 Back
then, Moscow sent its strategic bombers and
naval ships to the Western Hemisphere right after the five-day war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Moreover, the signs of increased
military cooperation with Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba coincided with the deterioration
of the situation in Ukraine and the annexation
of Crimea in 2014. The active participation of
Moscow in Venezuela’s latest crisis is yet another manifestation of the symbolic reciprocity
approach in Latin America.37 Since Russia has
limited conventional resources, it, therefore, resorts more frequently to asymmetrical methods
than traditional engagement tools.
Furthermore, the notion of symbolic reciprocity
extends beyond the practical capacity to dispatch strategic bombers and naval ships to the
U.S.’s “backyard.” In Russia today, Latin America and the Caribbean occupy a unique place in
the government-controlled media’s information
effort. The period in Russian-Latin American relations that followed the arrival of Putin to the
height of political power in Moscow saw regular
visits by Russian senior officials to Latin America and the Caribbean and vice versa. These
official contacts received extensive coverage
from Russian mass media in Latin America. In
this context, the narrative delivered through RT
and other news agencies emphasized the new
role of Russia as a global player. In addition,
they stressed that the United States resisted
the process of Russia regaining its due place
in the international arena and opposed building
a new multipolar order with the participation of
Latin American partners.
The message conveyed via RT and Sputnik to
Latin America highlights Russia’s regained power in the international arena and the Kremlin’s
“constructive role” in the region. Taking advantage of the initial success of acquiring a loyal audience for its media outlets, Moscow now
wants to use them as primary tools of strategic communication in the Western Hemisphere,
seeking to misinform viewers regarding the policies of the United States, its allies, and democratic governments in the region.
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RUSSIAN STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATION IN LATIN
AMERICA
As analyzed previously, the prospective for further growth of Russian media in Western countries is uncertain. However, in Latin America,
Russia relies on RT in Spanish and the Sputnik
news networks to a significantly greater degree
than in many other regions.38 There are several
reasons why Russian foreign-language broadcasting targets viewers in regions like Latin
America:
•

Russia’s government is aware it is difficult
to compete with established media in the
United States and Western Europe to attract new audiences by offering an alternative vision of international and domestic
events. For this reason, although RT started by broadcasting in English to viewers in English-speaking Western countries, it later turned most of its attention
to developing regions like Latin America.

•

Despite the significant presence of Western media in English in Latin America, foreign news providers in Spanish were limited until recently. At the same time, people
in the region had requested more diverse
coverage of political and international
topics compared to the mainstream local
media.39 Hence, from the Russian perspective, media markets in Latin America
would respond favorably to new international broadcasters in Spanish if the new
outlets would provide a different perspective on critical subjects of public interest.40

•

Russia often faces difficulties allocating
tangible resources to implement its policy agenda using traditional instruments of
power like trade and investment in Latin
America.41 Therefore, this explains Moscow’s attempts to sustain and expand its
influence by using a sharp power toolkit
with information as one of the principal
components considered cost-effective by
the Russian government to achieve its foreign policy goals, namely, diminishing the
relative power of the United States and discrediting democracy as a political system.

¿Sepa Más? Russia’s Strategic Communication in Latin America and the Caribbean

Looking back at the history of Russia’s post-Cold
War presence in the Latin American information space, the RT channel began continuously offering extensive coverage of international
events and comprehensive coverage of regional
and local Latin America and Caribbean developments in 2009. Ten years later, the channel
is readily available everywhere in the region. In
some cases, RT in Spanish is made available as
part of public TV broadcasting systems (Argentina,42 Venezuela, and Cuba) or as part of the
state satellite system in Bolivia. In other countries, such as Colombia, in addition to Claro—the
principal cable provider in the country—hundreds of small local cable networks retransmit
RT programming (Figure 2).43 RT pays cable operators to carry its signal on allied networks and
therefore makes it difficult to end collaboration
with Moscow—in many cases, Russian funding
helps smaller operators survive in the market.44

Note: As of August 2021.
Source: Created by the author with data from RT.com, actualidad.rt.com/acerca/cobertura/.

RT also has agreements to broadcast programs
on local channels; viewers often are unaware
the information they receive comes from Russia
(Figure 3). This approach allows RT to extend the
reach of Russia’s strategic communication to
potentially millions of additional viewers in Latin
America. At the same time, RT is freely available
24 hours per day and online. As of August 2021,
RT in Spanish on Facebook (www.facebook.
com/ActualidadRT/ ) had more than 18 million
followers. The RT in Spanish YouTube channel
has over five million subscribers, and RT Play in
Spanish on Facebook has more than six million
followers. Finally, more than 3.5 million people
follow RT in Spanish’s Twitter account twitter.
com/actualidadrt (Figure 4).45

Note: As of August 2021.
Source: Created by the author with data from YouTube,
Facebook, and Instagram.
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Concerning the geographic scope and audience reach, by the beginning of the 2020s, the
Russian advance in the Latin American information space was unparalleled compared to
other world regions. It allowed Moscow to design and test various strategic communication
strategies. Today, the most important Russian
media outlets operating in Latin America are RT
in Spanish (a TV and YouTube channel), Sputnik Mundo radio and news network, and the
Russia Beyond website. RT, in particular, has
become a true success story. For instance, in
one month—September 2020—according to
SimilarWebdata, RT’s Spanish-language website had more than 24 million visitors. 46 Another example of RT’s approach is the Ahí les va
YouTube channel and webpage47 (www.ahilesva.
info/) with only one anchor and presenter, Inna
Afinogenova.48 Since its October 2019 launch,
the channel is rapidly gaining popularity in the
region, not least because Afinogenova directly
engages local news celebrities in public debates
on sensitive topics.49 In the context of Russia’s
strategic communication, the most popular videos published on Afinogenova’s channel are the
ones dedicated to regional political processes,
including the 2021 elections in Ecuador (three
million viewers) and the 2020 elections in Bolivia (2.3 million viewers).50
A detailed examination of RT programming destined for the Latin American audience reveals
most content is, indeed, strategic communications designed to challenge the United States
and its allies on politically sensitive issues for
Latin Americans. The RT presenters and their
guests provide alternative explanations to those
projected by domestic and international “mainstream media” regarding migration, U.S.-Latin
American bilateral relations, interactions with
European Union countries, and other topics. At
the same time, they portray Russia and regimes
friendly to Moscow as a solid alternative to the
liberal democratic model, a scenario in which
political arrangements may offer better and
more effective solutions to the problems experienced by Latin American democracies.
Although Russian media in Latin America started by offering programs originally produced
for English-speaking audiences and translated
into Spanish, today, a significant part of the region’s Russian TV broadcast and newsfeeds are
designed specifically for Latin American viewers and readers, demonstrating a surprising
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knowledge of the regional context. More than
30 mostly native Spanish-speaking journalists
work for the channel.51 Russian media offers
professional quality programs targeting all age
groups.
From the perspective of symbolic reciprocity,
the purpose of Russian strategic communication by mass media outlets in Latin America is
to polarize opinions, which may raise public uncertainty in the actions and policies of the United States and democratic governments in the
region. RT in Spanish and Sputnik Mundo use
an “adapted persuasion” approach, in which the
messages address specific audiences and can
have a more significant impact on viewers. RT’s
programming in Latin America consists of reports, interviews, and investigative journalism,
many of which directly discredit U.S. domestic
and foreign policies. According to a recent study
by the Digital Forensic Research Laboratory
(DFRLab), between January 2019 and July 2020,
three leading sub-headlines on the RT website
actualidad.rt.com included “EE.UU.” (Spanish
abbreviation for “United States”), presidente,
and “Washington.” In addition, the same study
exposed that the news links shared by RT in
Spanish on Facebook (RT en Español) regularly
focused on U.S.-related topics.52 The anti-U.S.
approach is also seen in RT’s continuous coverage of almost all Latin American-focused topics, including migration, liberal democracy, and
economic and social issues (see Table 2).
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TABLE 2. SAMPLE PROGRAMS AND NARRATIVES OF RT IN SPANISH
Program name

The RT-defined emphasis of the
program

Program sample

Description of sample episode as published
on YouTube

Detrás de la
noticia

“What is left behind the news?

Castas de gente
en EE.UU. (June
17, 2021) youtu.
be/An870Y8qI7c

The ultra-rich in the United States have evaded
paying most of their personal taxes for years,
hiding the vastness of their wealth to avoid the
rules of the financial system. Cheating or naivety? The message of Biden’s vice president,
Kamala Harris, contradicts the words of the U.S.
president during his election campaign.

RT Reporta

“Explosive statements, imperceptible gestures, subtle details. Everything that our correspondents
experience, first-hand, in their
day-to-day work, now comes to you
through ‘RT reports’. A program that
allows us to know, through the personal and incisive gaze of journalists
who make RT, what happens in front
of and behind the cameras in every
part of the world where the events
that become news take place.”

Estados Unidos,
la lucha por el
agua (October 25,
2019)

Conversando
con Correa

Interview series with prominent political figures and intellectuals conducted by the former president of
Ecuador Rafael Correa.

Interview with
Evo Morales
(November 21,
2019)

“What do the photos of the current
international scene intend to show
us?” Support Russia’s official stand
on international topics.

Estados Unidos:
¿Sistema en colapso? January
15, 2021) youtu.
be/L6_KpGkFAs4

El Zoom

In this RT program, the lawyer and
writer Eva Golinger opens a space to
debate and investigate the most important events in Latin America and
the United States. We invite you to
immerse yourself in a territory full of
controversial events examined from
a wide variety of opinions.”

Not having drinking water could seem like a
problem in the poorest places on the planet, a
totally alien and distant reality for many people.
However, in the world’s leading economy, the
United States, thousands of families lack safe
y o u t u . b e / o R Y- water for their consumption. What is it like to
3HfFYW3g
live without the most basic good for human life?

In this edition of ‘Conversing with Correa’, the
former president of Ecuador talks with the former president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, about the
events that are shaking the Andean country in
the middle of a coup and about the causes that
youtu.be/p0vJi8d- have led to this tragic scene. “The right mountnud0
ed its campaign from the USA. Traditional campaigns are no longer as important as networks.”

‘El Zoom’ returns in 2021 analyzing the serious
situation in the US after the presidential elections and the successive political and social
confrontations. Javier Rodríguez Carrasco reveals the keys to this crisis and the reasons for
a chaos in which electoral fraud, impeachment
processes and cross accusations are mixed in
an explosive cocktail.

Source: RT en Español YouTube

The existence of diverse audiences spread
throughout Latin America allows Russian media
outlets to communicate information regarding
the latest developments in line with the priorities of Moscow’s regional foreign policy agenda. In recent years, two items have been on top
of that agenda: the crisis in Venezuela and the
COVID-19 pandemic.
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RT’s Coverage of Venezuela
For RT and Sputnik Mundo, the crisis in Venezuela is one of the priorities of media coverage
in Latin America. According to Sean Stainer and
Sarah Oates, there are several key messages
in Russia’s strategic communication regarding
Venezuela: “The United States wants Venezuela’s oil,” “The United States will create provocations,” and “The United States is hypocritical
and caused the crisis.”53 However, the most important narrative fits perfectly with the logic of
symbolic reciprocity: “The United States wants
regime change.”54 Russian media interprets the
opposition struggle as Washington’s attempt to
change the unfriendly regime in Caracas, identical to the “color revolutions” in Russia’s near
abroad. According to Russian government-controlled media, these efforts bring about the
deterioration of living standards, the suffering
of ordinary people, and widespread violence.
RT also links the Venezuelan crisis with “traditional imperialism and colonialism of the United
States” and calls U.S. support of the opposition
the “imperial games.”
As part of Russia’s strategic communication
agenda, RT is mobilized to provide information
backing Nicolas Maduro’s regime while justifying Moscow’s aid to Caracas as a necessary
move to protect the world “against malign U.S.
intentions.” Between January 2019 and June
2021, several main storylines can be identified
(see Figure 5).

Source: Headlines, RT Actualidad, January 2020 – June 2021,
actualidad.rt.com/ 55
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First, RT aimed to discredit Juan Guaidó and
cast doubts on his legitimacy and capacity to
govern. The Russian media outlet also emphasized that Venezuela’s interim president “was
kept afloat by the unrestricted support of the
United States, which became the main architect of the pressure against the South American
country and tried, unsuccessfully, to force the
departure of Maduro.”56 Overall, RT aired more
than 300 reports in which the name of Juan
Guaidó appeared in the headlines of its newsfeed.
Another storyline is dedicated to the impact of
U.S. sanctions. RT pretended to convince its
viewers that the main reason behind Venezuela’s catastrophic situation was not the disastrous economic policy of the Chavista government but, rather, U.S. sanctions. In this context,
RT dedicated numerous reports to praising the
efforts of Maduro’s government to govern the
country with timely assistance offered by Moscow.
RT’s Coverage of the COVID-19 Pandemic
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic
was beneficial for Russian strategic communication. Starting in March 2020, Russian media
outlets began disseminating a particular type
of COVID-19 narrative that took advantage of
uncertainty and confusion in Latin America regarding the new virus. At the beginning of the
pandemic, the reports aired by RT and other affiliated media outlets focused on Russia’s effort
to provide relief to the population and effectively manage the risks associated with COVID19.57 RT aired many reports covering Russian
government donations of pharmaceuticals
and high-tech medical equipment. In practical
terms, the offerings were small. Yet, the Moscow-controlled media provided comprehensive
coverage of the effect Russia’s delivery of donations had on friendly Latin American nations.
The COVID-related strategic communication
originating in Russia and destined for Latin
American changed following the announcement
of the “Sputnik-V” vaccine and the beginning of
the “COVID vaccine race.” First, the news of registering the Sputnik-V vaccine was interpreted
as evidence of Russia being one of the most
technologically advanced nations,58 which is
“often denied this status in the region because
of bad publicity originated in the Western mass
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media.” In addition, RT and Sputnik Mundo alleged that pro-U.S. Latin American governments
were unwilling to acquire the Russian vaccine—
not because it does not comply with all the
necessary protocols and tests, but because of
their political ties with Washington. This type
of strategy has already created several noticeable tensions in the Latin American information
space.59 Recently, Russia signed agreements to
start producing the Sputnik vaccine in Argentina and negotiating the delivery of Russian
vaccines to other Latin American countries.
Therefore, there is little doubt that Moscow will
continue to exploit politically sensitive topics
such as the COVID-19 vaccine (Figure 6).

Source: Headlines RT Actualidad, March 2020 – June 2021,
actualidad.rt.com/.60

When reviewing the activity of Russia’s media
outlets in the region, it is essential to examine
Sputnik Mundo, another critical instrument of
Russia’s strategic communication toolkit.61 Between January 2020 and June 2021, this news
agency complemented RT’s coverage of the
Venezuelan crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America. The head of Sputnik Mundo
emphasized in an interview that it does not follow the same information strategy as RT.62 Yet,
Sputnik Mundo’s ultimate objectives fit Russia’s
strategic communication perfectly (Figure 7).

Source: mundo.sputniknews.com/, Note: Main story line
from June 2020 to July 2021.63

CONCLUSION
By 2021, RT and other Russian government-sponsored media became a familiar
source of information for many Latin Americans. Moscow managed to bring back to Latin
Americans the possibility of being exposed to
an alternative view to the one promoted by the
United States and democratic governments in
the region for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet propaganda machine. At the
same time, while RT and Sputnik Mundo are undoubtedly attractive to anti-U.S. segments of
Latin American society, the Russian media succeeded in recruiting other types of followers by
offering diverse programming that targets heterogeneous audiences. Although some scholars
argue that RT’s immediate impact on its foreign
audience is “exposure, not endorsement,”64 other studies show that today, RT information coverage is an aggressive purposeful intervention
in international media space that goes beyond a
simple dissemination of Moscow’s overarching
narratives.65
There are several reasons why the potential
of Russia’s strategic communication in Latin
America via its media outlets should not be underestimated. First, RT in Spanish and Sputnik
Mundo have established a strong presence in
the Latin American information space, including
TV broadcasting, radio, social media networks,
and digital platforms with millions of followers.
Second, RT and Sputnik Mundo have guaranteed
funding and, as such, can expand their reach
by contracting new operators and offering their
programs and newsfeeds via other TV channels
and news agencies. RT pays local operators to
carry its TV signal and thus makes it difficult for
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them to stop collaborating with Moscow. Third,
RT and Sputnik Mundo use a “tailor-made” approach to targeting diverse segments of Latin
American societies and can quickly adapt their
storylines following the changing priorities of
Russia’s foreign policy toward the region.
One of the factors behind RT’s success in Latin
America is a lack of understanding of the nature of Moscow’s interest in the region’s information space. Many Latin Americans perceive
the growing incidence of Russia’s media in the
region as something “normal,” a part of the exercise of freedom of expression and diversity of
opinions. In reality, however, it is part of a foreign policy strategy designed to achieve specific objectives by the Putin government. Russia
thrives in communicating desired explanations
for important developments with comfortable
ease and makes it difficult for democratic governments to repair the damage.
The sharing of democratic values among the
countries of the Western Hemisphere is the
key to security in the region.66 The prevalence
of like-minded democracies is what makes the
political geography of the Western Hemisphere
unique. Since Russia is not a democracy, RT and
Sputnik Mundo often refer to democracy as a
political regime with many weaknesses. In this
context, one of the long-term goals of Russia in
Latin America is to carry out continuous strategic communication via government-controlled
outlets, which undermines the idea of democratic order.
Contrary to the United States and Western Europe,67 the advance of Russia’s strategic communication in Latin America meets almost no
opposition. There have been only a few public
debates on RT and Sputnik in the regional information space. Besides, there have been no specific surveys to learn RT’s impact on Latin American public opinion. Still, the limited data, already
available, shows that RT and Sputnik Mundo
passed beyond the point of simply exposing
their audiences to Russia’s strategic communication to begin engaging Latin Americans in discussing and disseminating narratives promoted
by Moscow.68 Therefore, it is necessary to continue raising the awareness of decision-makers and the Latin American public regarding
the nature of Russia’s government-controlled
mass media.69 At the same time, it is vital to
challenge Russia’s strategic communication by
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escalating government-led efforts. While the
United States promotes its political culture by
supporting democratic movements and local
mass media in Latin America, U.S. media consists of predominantly commercial outlets. The
mainstream media in English is the first choice
of highly educated Latin Americans, a minority
in the region. CNN en Español (2.5 million subscribers on YouTube, many based in the United States), CNN Chile (0.5 million subscribers),
CNN Radio Argentina, and several others have
established impressive audiences. Still, their
further growth depends on market factors. At
present, U.S. government-sponsored information outlets have limited reach in the region. For
instance, Voice of America in Spanish has only
160,000 subscribers on YouTube compared to
the millions of followers of RT and Sputnik. From
this perspective, Russia’s strategic communications have a broader reach to those segments
of Latin American societies that—in the context
of growing economic and social difficulties in
the region—might be willing to endorse views
originating in Moscow.
As Dmitriy Trenin and Andrei Lipsky argue,70 the
current confrontation of Russia with the West is
not a new cold war. Nevertheless, many Russian
decision-makers consider that Russia is at war.
Not a “hot war,” but a new kind of confrontation.
Even though the nature of the ongoing standoff
is different from the historical Cold War, it can
be characterized by a similar level of tensions
with the United States and its allies. Moreover, elites in Moscow are convinced there is
little hope the tensions will melt anytime soon.
In this context, Russia will attempt to sustain
and extend its strategic communication in Latin
America via RT in Spanish, Sputnik Mundo, and
other media outlets as a cost-effective tool of
its foreign policy toward the region.71
Finally, RT and Sputnik are not the only strategic communication tools used in Latin America,
although they are the primary ones. In recent
years Moscow has increased its public diplomacy efforts to communicate Russia’s grand narratives by opening Russian language institutes,
recruiting students to study in Russia, and involving the Russian diaspora in regional public
events. These emerging developments will benefit RT and Sputnik Mundo by providing news
events to include in its information coverage.
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